Two-factor authentication isn't our savior. It won't defend against phishing.
It's not going to prevent identity theft. It's not going to secure online accounts from fraudulent transactions. It solves the security problems we had
ten years ago, not the security problems we have today.
The problem with passwords is that they're too easy to lose control of. People give them to other people. People write them down, and other people read them.
People send them in e-mail, and that e-mail is intercepted. People use them to log into remote servers, and their communications are eavesdropped on. They're
also easy to guess. And once any of that happens, the password no longer works as an authentication token because you can't be sure who is typing that password
Two-factor authentication mitigates this problem. If your password includes a number that changes every minute, or a unique reply to a random challenge, then
it's harder for someone else to intercept. You can't write down the ever-changing
part. An intercepted password won't be good the next time it's needed. And a two-factor password is harder to guess. Sure, someone can always give his password
and token to his secretary, but no solution is foolproof.
These tokens have been around for at least two decades, but it's only recently that they have gotten mass-market attention. AOL is rolling them out. Some banks
are issuing them to customers, and even more are talking about doing it. It seems
that corporations are finally waking up to the fact that passwords don't provide
adequate security, and are hoping that two-factor authentication will fix their problems.
Unfortunately, the nature of attacks has changed over those two decades. Back then, the threats were all passive: eavesdropping and offline password guessing.
Today, the threats are more active: phishing and Trojan horses.
Here are two new active attacks we're starting to see:
* Man-in-the-Middle attack. An attacker puts up a fake bank website and entices user to that website. User types in his password, and the attacker in
turn uses it to access the bank's real website. Done right, the user will never realize that he isn't at the bank's website. Then the attacker either disconnects
the user and makes any fraudulent transactions he wants, or passes along the user's banking transactions while making his own transactions at the same time.
* Trojan attack. Attacker gets Trojan installed on user's computer. When user logs into his bank's website, the attacker piggybacks on that session via the
Trojan to make any fraudulent transaction he wants.
See how two-factor authentication doesn't solve anything? In the first case, the
attacker can pass the ever-changing part of the password to the bank along with the never-changing part. And in the second case, the attacker is relying on the
user to log in.
The real threat is fraud due to impersonation, and the tactics of impersonation will change in response to the defenses. Two-factor authentication will force
criminals to modify their tactics, that's all.
Recently I've seen examples of two-factor authentication using two different communications paths: call it "two-channel authentication." One bank sends a
challenge to the user's cell phone via SMS and expects a reply via SMS. If you assume that all your customers have cell phones, then this results in a two-factor
authentication process without extra hardware. And even better, the second authentication piece goes over a different communications channel than the first;
eavesdropping is much, much harder.
But in this new world of active attacks, no one cares. An attacker using a man-in-the-middle attack is happy to have the user deal with the SMS portion of
the log-in, since he can't do it himself. And a Trojan attacker doesn't care, because he's relying on the user to log in anyway.
Two-factor authentication is not useless. It works for local login, and it works
within some corporate networks. But it won't work for remote authentication over
the Internet. I predict that banks and other financial institutions will spend millions outfitting their users with two-factor authentication tokens. Early
adopters of this technology may very well experience a significant drop in fraud
for a while as attackers move to easier targets, but in the end there will be a negligible drop in the amount of fraud and identity
|1. ||View Comment|
All true, but the 2FA that has been implemented for some years by my bank (Barclays) requires transaction details (e.g. amount and destination account number) to be keyed into the authentication token (which has its own keypad) and the signed response to be keyed into the website.
The token uses the crypto module on my bank card's chip, so is a relatively cheap device interchangeable which is between all of the bank's customers.
This mitigates against both trojans and MITM as it prevents the attacker from performing any malicious activity once logged in without somehow getting me to enter their chosen amount and account number into the signing device (albeit they can still view my account statements, which may also be undesirable).
I'm pretty sure that Barclays are not the only bank in the UK to adopt this approach, and would be surprised if other countries had not also followed suit. Of course, the US are still to adopt chips on bank cards, so are many years behind the rest of the world on this one.
View Tutorial By: Joe Bloggs at 2013-04-22 13:40:24